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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a federal 
spending program that assists school districts in educating students with 
disabilities. To receive federal funding, school districts must educate 
disabled students in the “ least restrictive environment” appropriate for 
each child. This provision indicates a strong congressional preference to 
educate students with disabilities in regular education classrooms. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has yet to interpret the IDEA’s least restrictive 
environment (LRE) mandate. Consequently, the federal circuit courts 
employ different tests to assess whether a school district has satisfied the 
LRE requirement. These divergent interpretations highlight the need to 
implement a clear and uniform approach to evaluating states’ educational 
placement decisions. This note first examines the history and purpose 
underlying the IDEA’s requirements. Next, this note discusses the various 
judicial tests used to evaluate school district compliance with the LRE 
provision. This note contends that the courts should adopt the two-prong 
test formulated by the Fifth Circuit because that framework best reflects 
Congress’s intent and resolves the tension between the IDEA’s competing 
mandates.
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a federal spending 
program that assists school districts in educating disabled children.1 To receive federal 
funds, school districts must provide disabled children with a “free appropriate public 
education” in the “least restrictive environment.”2 The IDEA’s least restrictive 
environment (LRE) provision requires school districts to educate disabled students 
with nondisabled students in the regular classroom to the greatest extent possible.3 
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2013).
2. Id. § 1412(a)(1), (5). 
3. Integrating students with disabilities into the regular education curriculum is commonly referred to as 
“mainstreaming.” Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1989). However, in 
the context of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the term “mainstreaming” 
should not be treated as interchangeable with “inclusion.” Whereas inclusion connotes a normative 
philosophical commitment to educating disabled students in the regular classroom, with or without use 
of supplementary aids, the mainstreaming requirement underlying the least restrictive environment 
(LRE) provision envisions a “continuum” of appropriate educational placements, rather than an 
inclusion-exclusion dichotomy. See Susan C. Bon, Confronting the Special Education Inclusion Debate: A 
Proposal to Adopt New State-Wide LRE Guidelines, 249 Educ. L. Rep. 1, 5–6 (2009) (“[T]he emphasis 
on inclusion rather than LRE limits the range of placement options considered for meeting a child’s 
educational needs.  .  .  . As long as the least restrictive principle is perceived as interchangeable with 
inclusion[,] . . . decisions about the appropriate placement are likely to cause conflict in school districts 
and in the courts.”); see also Patrick Howard, The Least Restrictive Environment: How to Tell?, 33 J.L. & 
Educ. 167, 169 (2004) (defining “mainstreaming” as “the philosophy that if [a disabled] student cannot 
be educated in the general classroom, then the student should still spend as much time as possible 
integrated into regular school day activities”).
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However, determining when it is appropriate to remove a disabled child from the 
general classroom is a highly contested issue.4
 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to interpret the IDEA’s LRE provision.5 
Consequently, the lower federal courts employ different tests to determine whether a 
school district has complied with the LRE requirement.6 This note contends that the 
courts should adopt a uniform, nationwide standard for assessing school district 
compliance with the LRE provision. Part II of this note discusses the IDEA and 
examines the history and purpose underlying its LRE requirement. Part III presents 
the differing judicial tests that the circuit courts have developed for determining 
whether school districts’ educational placement decisions satisfy the LRE mandate. 
Part IV argues that federal courts should adopt the two-prong test formulated by the 
Fifth Circuit.
ii. thE indiVidUaLs With disabiLitiEs EdUCatiOn aCt
 Numerous disabled children have been denied educational opportunities 
throughout our nation’s history:
In 1970, before enactment of the federal protections in IDEA, schools in 
America educated only one in five students with disabilities. More than 1 
million students were excluded from public schools, and another 3.5 million 
did not receive appropriate services. Many states had laws excluding certain 
students, including those who were blind, deaf, or labeled “emotionally 
disturbed” or “mentally retarded.” Almost 200,000 school-age children with 
mental retardation or emotional disabilities were institutionalized.7
As the civil rights movement seized the nation in the 1960s, the need for education 
reform became glaringly clear.8 In response to the segregation and inadequate 
4. See generally Bon, supra note 3; see also Stacy Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 
2006 BYU Educ. & L.J. 189, 190 (2006), available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2006/
iss1/5 (“The debate over the education of students with disabilities continues to be a battle over 
competing interests and priorities.”).
5. In Board of Education v. Rowley, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the IDEA requires “educat[ing] 
handicapped children with nonhandicapped children whenever possible.” 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982). 
However, the Court “failed to provide a specific test or clear guidance to schools with respect to 
decisions about LRE and the educational placement.” Bon, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Bon, supra note 3, at 2–3 (“In response to parental challenges of school districts’ LRE placement 
decisions, three distinct tests have emerged in the federal circuit courts.”). 
7. Nat’l Council on Disability, Back to School on Civil Rights 6 (2000), available at http://www.
ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/7bfb3c01_5c95_4d33_94b7_b80171d0b1bc?document.pdf. Notably, 
disabled children “living in low-income, ethnic and racial minority, or rural communities” were more 
susceptible to exclusion. Id. Today, the IDEA defines “mental retardation” as “significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested 
during the developmental period, that adversely affects a child’s educational performance.” 34 C.F.R. § 
300.8(c)(6) (2014).
8. See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964) (“The time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has run 
out, and that phrase can no longer justify denying . . . school children their constitutional rights to an 
education equal to that afforded [to other students].”); see also Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 
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education of disabled children, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act (EAHCA) in 1975,9 which was renamed “IDEA” in 1990.10 Since its 
inception, the IDEA has created a multitude of educational opportunities for 
previously excluded children.11
 A. The Civil Rights Movement and Education Reform
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education12 ultimately sparked 
the desegregation of students with disabilities.13 Although the decision specifically 
concerned segregation based on race, it highlighted the importance of providing an 
equal education to all students—including students with disabilities.14 In the early 
1970s, two monumental district court opinions seized on the Court’s holding in Brown 
to prevent states from denying public education to disabled students.15
 In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, parents 
of thirteen intellectually disabled children brought a class action on behalf of all 
intellectually disabled school-age students who had been excluded from Pennsylvania 
public schools.16 These children were excluded because Pennsylvania law exempted the 
state’s school districts from educating children who, on account of their mental 
disability, were considered “uneducable and untrainable”17—a standard then defined by 
the state’s Public School Code as having a mental age below five years of age.18 
439 (1968) (“It is incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises 
meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation.”).
9. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.
10. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103.
11. Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons from Special Education Legislation, 29 Fordham 
Urb. L.J. 759, 759 (2001).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that racially segregated 
schools were unconstitutional, finding that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” Id. 
at 495.
13. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, some lower courts sought to extend Brown’s 
constitutional promise of equal education to disabled children. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. 
Supp. 866, 874–75 (D.D.C. 1972) (relying partly on Brown to prohibit the categorical exclusion of 
disabled children from public school education); see also Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania 
(PARC), 343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
14. “[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added). 
Thus, while the Supreme Court’s holding in Brown was limited to racial segregation, its opinion spoke 
in broad and neutral terms, on which some lower courts seized to extend Brown’s protections to disabled 
children. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874–75; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 297.
15. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874–75; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 297.
16. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 281–82. 
17. Id. at 282 (citing 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-1375 (West 1965)).
18. 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-1304. Section 1304 of the Pennsylvania Public School Code provided at the 
time that “[t]he board of school directors may refuse to accept or retain beginners who have not attained 
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Referencing the Court’s decision in Brown, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found 
that the state could not exclude students from public school based on their disability19 
and must at the very least provide a hearing before denying a disabled child a public 
education.20 Significantly, the court also required the school district to presume that 
“placement in a regular public school class is preferable to placement in a special public 
school class and placement in a special public school class is preferable to placement in 
any other type of program of education and training.”21 The decision ultimately 
highlighted two policies: (1) disabled children are entitled to the same educational 
opportunities as their nondisabled classmates; and (2) disabled children should be 
educated in the regular classroom with their nondisabled peers whenever possible.22
 In Mills v. Board of Education, school-age children brought a class action 
challenging the D.C. Board of Education’s denial of public education to children 
who were classified as intellectually disabled, hyperactive, or emotionally disturbed.23 
Similar to PARC, the Mills court referenced Brown’s rationale regarding racial 
desegregation,24 holding that the District of Columbia was required to educate 
disabled children since the school district had undertaken to provide education to 
those without disabilities.25
 Although Mills and PARC were only binding in Pennsylvania and the District of 
Columbia, they provided momentum for equal educational benefits to disabled 
students.26 The principles established by these two decisions ultimately resulted in 
the desegregation of students with disabilities in public schools, paving the way for a 
legislative policy that would soon bring about significant education reform.27
a mental age of five years, as determined by the supervisor of special education or a properly certificated 
public school psychologist.” Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC), 334 F. Supp. 
1257, 1260 (E.D. Pa. 1971), amended by 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
19. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 297. 
20. Id. at 284–85.
21. PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1260.
22. See id.
23. 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972).
24. Id. at 874–75 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
25. Id.
26. As recognized by the Supreme Court in Rowley, “the principles which [Mills and PARC] established are 
the principles which, to a significant extent, guided the drafters of the [Education of the Handicapped 
Act].” Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 194 (1982).
27. “[E]ncouraging access of handicapped students to public schools[,] [Mills and PARC] spurred Congress in 
1974 to increase federal funding for existing programs and require, for the first time, that states adopt as 
their goal to ‘provide full educational opportunities to all handicapped children.’” Heather J. Russell, 
Florence County School District Four v. Carter: A Good “IDEA”; Suggestions for Implementing the Carter 
Decision and Improving the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 1479, 1482 (1996) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 
Stat. 579, 580).
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 B.  Statutory Developments: Education for All Handicapped Children Act and the IDEA
 The pervasive practice of excluding disabled students from public school 
education inspired immense congressional concern in the wake of the Mills and 
PARC decisions.28 As the judicial system embraced education reform, Congress 
recognized that deficient state funds and failing initiatives were depriving disabled 
children of meaningful educational opportunities,29 and was thus concerned that a 
majority of disabled children “were either totally excluded from schools or [were] 
sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to 
‘drop out.’”30 Consequently, Congress enacted the EAHCA in 1975.31
 In passing the EAHCA, Congress exhibited a strong federal commitment to 
educating children with disabilities.32 The EAHCA’s legislative history shows that 
Congress intended through the collective efforts of federal, state, and local 
government33 to extend equal education access to children with disabilities and, as a 
result, the federal government increased funding for special education to assist school 
districts in meeting their statutory and constitutional obligations.34
 The EAHCA was renamed in 1990 as the IDEA35 and was subsequently 
amended in 1997.36 These amendments “both renewed the importance of the LRE 
provision by providing that the regular classroom must be the default placement and 
28. Congress became especially concerned with the fact that at least “1.75 million handicapped children 
[were] receiving no educational services at all, and 2.5 million handicapped children [were] receiving an 
inappropriate education.” S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432 
[hereinafter Senate Report]; see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180–81 (defining the minimum educational 
standard required under the IDEA).
29. See Senate Report, supra note 28, at 7 (“In recent years decisions in more than 36 court cases in the 
States have recognized the rights of handicapped children to an appropriate education. States have made 
an effort to comply; however, lack of financial resources [] prevented the implementation of the various 
decisions which have been rendered.”).
30. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975)).
31. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (1988 and Supp. V 1993)). 
32. Congress also hoped that, “[w]ith proper education services, many [intellectually disabled students] 
would be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to remain 
burdens.” Senate Report, supra note 28, at 9.
33. Caryn Gelbman, Note, Suspensions and Expulsions Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: 
Victory for Handicapped Children or Defeat for School Officials?, 36 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 137, 
142–43 (1989). 
34. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, 775 (“[I]t is in 
the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to 
meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the law.”).
35. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2013)).
36. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482). 
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emphasized the role of parent and student input into the decision-making process.”37 
Notwithstanding these revisions, educating disabled students with their nondisabled 
peers remained a core principle of the IDEA.38
 C. The IDEA’s Requirements
 The IDEA provides federal financial assistance to state and local agencies to 
educate children with disabilities.39 Covered disabilities include “intellectual 
disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language 
impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional 
disturbance[,]  .  .  . orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other 
health impairments, or specific learning disabilities.”40 Federal grants to states under 
the IDEA are divided into permissive and mandatory uses: funds may be used for 
various “authorized activities,” such as professional development and training, 
technological equipment, and mental health services;41 on the other hand, funds 
must be used to monitor, enforce, and investigate complaints, as well as to implement 
the IDEA’s mediation process.42
 However, eligibility to receive financial assistance under the IDEA is contingent 
on states: (1) providing disabled children with a “free appropriate public education,”43 
(2) devising an “individualized education program,”44 and (3) educating disabled 
children in the “least restrictive environment.”45
  1. Free Appropriate Public Education
 To qualify for federal financial assistance under the IDEA, a state must 
demonstrate that its educational policy ensures that all disabled children have access 
37. Sarah E. Farley, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom Placement of Students with Disabilities 
Under the IDEA, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 809, 817 (2002). In 2004, Congress amended and reauthorized the 
IDEA as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA). 20 U.S.C. § 1400 
(2004). Despite the IDEA’s reauthorization, the act is still commonly referred to as the “IDEA.” See 
Laura Rothstein & Julia Irzyk, Disabilities and the Law § 1:2 (4th ed. 2014).
38. Integration is indeed the linchpin of the IDEA. The principle of integration is codified in the IDEA’s 
LRE provision, under which children with disabilities must be educated with due regard to their special 
needs, but in an environment that allows for the maximum possible interaction with their nondisabled 
peers. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2013). To this end, the default placement for children with disabilities 
is the regular classroom. 34 C.F.R. §300.114(a)(2) (2014).
39. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411.
40. Id. § 1401(3)(A)(i). 
41. Id. § 1411(e)(2)(B)–(C).
42. Id. § 1411(e)(2)(B). 
43. Id. § 1412(a)(1).
44. Id. § 1412(a)(4).
45. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
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to a free appropriate public education.46 IDEA § 1401(9) defines “free appropriate 
public education” as:
[S]pecial education and related services that—
(A)  have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C)  include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school 
education in the State involved; and
(D)  are provided in conformity with the individualized education program 
required under section 1414(d) of this title.47
Section 1401(29) defines “special education” as:
[S]pecially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique 
needs of a child with a disability, including—
(A)  instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and 
institutions, and in other settings; and 
(B) instruction in physical education.48
“Related services” are defined as “transportation, and such developmental, corrective, 
and other supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a child with a disability 
to benefit from special education.”49
 The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Board of Education v. Rowley shed light on the 
free appropriate public education provision, explaining that “[i]mplicit in the 
congressional purpose of providing access to a free appropriate public education is the 
requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some 
educational benefit upon the handicapped child.”50 Emphasizing that schools need 
only provide a “basic floor of opportunity”51 to disabled students, the Court clarified 
that an “appropriate education” does not mean “a potential-maximizing education.”52
 Drawing from the statute’s text and legislative history, the Court posited a two-
part test for assessing whether a school has provided a free appropriate public education. 
First, a court must determine whether the state complied with the procedural 
requirements of the IDEA.53 Second, the court must evaluate whether the IEP is 
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”54
46. Id. § 1412(a)(1).
47. Id. § 1401(9).
48. Id. § 1401(29). 
49. Id. § 1401(26) (including speech-language pathology and audiology services, psychological services, 
physical and occupational therapy, counseling services, and social work services among others). 
50. 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 201.
52. Id. at 197 n.21.
53. Id. at 206.
54. Id. at 206–07. 
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  2. Individualized Education Program
 The IDEA requires the “development of an individualized educational program 
(IEP) for each child that incorporates his or her special needs, so that the child may 
benefit from the program offered.”55 An IEP is a written statement for each child 
with a disability, which includes the child’s “present level of academic and functional 
performance, measurable annual goals, special-education and supplemental services, 
and any program modifications for the child, along with an explanation of the extent 
to which the child will not participate with non-disabled children in regular classes 
and activities.”56 Additionally, the start date, frequency, location, and duration of any 
special supplementary services or modifications must be included in the IEP.57 The 
“IEP Team,” which creates and revises the IEP,58 is comprised of the child’s parents, 
the child’s regular education teacher, a special education teacher, a representative of 
the local educational agency, and any other individuals who may be acquainted with 
the child’s cognitive and mental capacities.59
 In developing the IEP, the team must consider the child’s strengths, the parents’ 
concerns, the child’s most recent evaluation results, and the child’s academic, 
developmental, and functional needs.60 In addition, the team must consider “special 
factors” in specific circumstances, such as using behavioral interventions if the child 
has behavioral problems or providing Braille instruction for children who are blind 
or visually impaired.61 The team reviews the IEP at least once a year “to determine 
whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved.”62 The IEP may be revised 
“as appropriate” to address the child’s lack of progress or anticipated needs.63 
Importantly, the IDEA requires that the IEP enable a student with disabilities to 
receive an education in the “least restrictive environment.”64
  3. Least Restrictive Environment 
 Federal funding is also contingent on ensuring that students with disabilities are 
educated in the least restrictive environment.65 IDEA § 1412(a)(5)(A) states:
55. Francis Amendola et al., 78A C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 967 (West 2015).
56. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2008). 
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII) (2013). 
58. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
59. See id. 
60. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(A).
61. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(B). 
62. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i).
63. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii).
64. Id. § 1412(a)(5). 
65. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i)–(ii).
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To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including 
children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated 
with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or 
other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational 
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a 
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary 
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.66
Thus, the IDEA requires schools to educate nondisabled students and disabled 
students in an integrated setting to the maximum possible extent. Educating a 
disabled student in a regular education classroom with nondisabled students is 
commonly referred to as “mainstreaming.”67 A disabled student may only be removed 
from the regular education environment and placed in a separate specialized 
classroom or school if the student cannot be educated in regular classes with 
supplemental aids and services at a satisfactory level.68
 The Department of Education’s (DOE) regulations enforce the IDEA’s LRE 
provision and offer guidance on the kinds of services and placements a school district 
must provide.69 In addition to educating the disabled with their nondisabled peers 
whenever possible, a school district “must ensure that a continuum of alternative 
placements is available to meet the needs of children with disabilities for special 
education and related services.”70 The types of alternative placements range from 
regular class instruction (the least restrictive) to special class instruction (more 
restrictive) to hospital and institutional instruction (the most restrictive).71 If a 
disabled child is educated in the regular classroom, the school district must provide 
supplementary services such as resource rooms or itinerant instruction.72 Resource 
rooms provide special instruction to disabled students in a small group or in an 
individualized setting for a portion of the day.73 This type of service reinforces the 
IDEA’s intent to maximize disabled students’ opportunity to be educated with their 
peers.
 Ultimately, the LRE requirement and DOE regulations ref lect a strong 
congressional preference to educate disabled students alongside nondisabled students in 
regular classrooms.74 However, the preference for mainstreaming must be balanced 
against the IDEA’s primary goal of ensuring that public schools provide disabled 
66. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
67. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
69. 34 C.F.R. § 300.114–.120 (2014). 
70. Id. § 300.115(a). 
71. See id. § 300.115(b)(1).
72. Id. § 300.115(b)(2). 
73. Sue Watson, What Is the Special Education Resource Room?, http://specialed.about.com/od/idea/a/
resourceroom.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
74. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2013); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(i).
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children with a free appropriate public education.75 There is thus an inherent tension 
between the IDEA requirement of a free appropriate public education and the IDEA 
policy of educating disabled children in the regular classroom, since regular classes 
generally do not provide a specifically tailored education for a disabled child’s individual 
needs76 and, in some cases, special education is the only appropriate placement.77 For 
these children, education in the regular classroom would fail to meet their unique and 
specialized needs and would therefore prevent them from receiving the IDEA’s 
mandated educational benefit—a free appropriate public education.78
 Reconciling these two fundamental objectives is problematic in light of the act’s 
lack of any substantive standards for striking the proper balance between its LRE 
mandate and its free appropriate public education requirement. “This tension invokes 
the choice between specialized services and some degree of separate treatment on the 
one side and minimized labeling and minimized segregation on the other.”79
 Moreover, the Supreme Court has yet to interpret the IDEA’s LRE provision—
which has led to a three-way circuit split among the lower federal courts over the 
proper criteria to consider in evaluating state compliance with the LRE requirement.80
 D. Procedural Safeguards
 The IDEA affords disabled children and their parents procedural safeguards in 
the event that a dispute arises between the parents and the school district. If a child’s 
IEP or educational placement is changed, the child’s parents must be notified.81 The 
parents may file a complaint with a designated state agency if they disagree with 
their child’s IEP or educational placement,82 and an “impartial due process hearing” 
will be held.83 Either party may appeal the hearing officer’s decision in a “[s]tate 
court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.”84
75. Amendola et al., supra note 55, § 998.
76. See, e.g., Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044–45 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he [IDEA]’s 
mandate for a free appropriate public education qualifies and limits its mandate for education in the 
regular classroom.”); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695 (11th Cir. 1991); Oberti v. Bd. 
of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he apparent tension within the [IDEA] between the 
strong preference for mainstreaming, and the requirement that schools provide individualized programs 
tailored to the specific needs of each disabled child.” (citations omitted)).
77. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1044 (“The nature or severity of some children’s handicaps is such that only 
special education can address their needs.”).
78. See id.
79. Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 Law 
& Contemp. Probs. 157, 181 (1985); see also Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1045.
80. See discussion infra Part III.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2013).
82. Id. § 1415(b)(6).
83. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A). 
84. Id. § 1415(i)(1)–(2), (g). 
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 These procedural safeguards have opened the gates to the courthouse.85 Litigation 
over a disabled child’s educational placement has become a controversial issue and 
will continue to be so until the federal courts adopt a clear and uniform interpretation 
of the LRE provision.86
iii.  diffEring JUdiCiaL apprOaChEs tO dEtErMining COMpLianCE With thE 
LrE MandatE
 Determining whether a state has educated a disabled student in the least restrictive 
environment to the maximum extent appropriate is controversial, due in large part to 
the lack of Supreme Court guidance.87 As a result, there is currently a three-way circuit 
split over which test to apply when evaluating state compliance with the LRE mandate. 
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits apply a three-factor test, which focuses on the 
feasibility of providing special services in a regular classroom setting.88 In contrast, the 
Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits employ a two-prong test that 
mimics the statute’s text and turns on “the school’s proper use of supplementary aids 
and services, which may enable the school to educate a child with disabilities for a 
majority of the time within a regular classroom, while at the same time addressing that 
child’s unique educational needs.”89 Refusing to adopt either of these approaches, the 
Ninth Circuit devised its own four-factor balancing test.90
 A. The Three-Factor Feasibility Test
 In 1983, the Sixth Circuit was the first to establish the three-factor feasibility 
test to inform school district decisions in determining the appropriate placement for 
children with disabilities;91 the test was subsequently adopted by the Fourth and 
Eighth Circuits.92
85. See Patricia A. Massey & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters: Toward a Law School Clinical 
Model for Serving Youth with Special Education Needs, 11 Clinical L. Rev. 271, 277–78 (2005) 
(describing the various types of IDEA violations on the basis of which parents of disabled children file 
compliance complaints).
86. See Bon, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that the “adoption of clear state-wide LRE guidelines” would 
alleviate “the educational, financial, and emotional strains that are placed on parents and educators 
when special education litigation reaches the courts”).
87. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
88. See DeVries v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 
158 (8th Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983). 
89. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008); L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 
379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991); Daniel 
R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
90. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting the 
district court’s four-factor balancing test).
91. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
92. See DeVries, 882 F.2d at 878–79; A.W., 813 F.2d at 163–64. 
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  1. Established by the Sixth Circuit
 Neill Roncker was a nine-year-old boy with severe intellectual disability.93 He 
also suffered from seizures and required constant supervision due to his inability to 
identify dangerous situations.94 In 1976, Neill attended the Arlitt Child Development 
Center, where he had contact with nondisabled children—contact from which he 
was believed to benefit.95 In 1979, Neill’s parents, school psychologists, and a member 
of the Hamilton County Board of Mental Retardation held a conference to evaluate 
Neill’s IEP as required by the IDEA.96 The evaluation resulted in the school district’s 
decision to place Neill in a school exclusively for the disabled where Neill would have 
no interaction with nondisabled children.97 Refusing to accept the placement, the 
Ronckers sought a due process hearing.98 The impartial hearing officer determined 
that the school district failed to establish that placing Neill in a school exclusively for 
children with disabilities afforded the maximum appropriate contact with nondisabled 
children, as required by the IDEA’s LRE provision.99
 The school district appealed to the Ohio State Board of Education, which agreed 
that Neill would benefit from placement in a specialized school, but reasoned that 
Neill should also be afforded contact with nondisabled children “during lunch, recess 
and transportation to and from school.”100 However, the board did not explain how 
to implement this “split program.”101
 The Ronckers subsequently filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio, alleging that Neill “could be provided the special instruction he 
needed in a setting where he could have contact with non-handicapped children.”102 
During the pendency of the litigation, Neill attended a regular public school and 
interacted with nondisabled students during lunch, gym, and recess.103 The school 
district asserted that the educational benefits of placing Neill at a special facility 
outweighed the marginal benefits he would gain from attending a regular public 
school.104 Finding that Neill did not make any significant progress while attending 
93. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060. 
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1061.
99. Id. 
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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the regular public school, the district court upheld Neill’s placement in the school for 
intellectually disabled children.105
 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the school district complied 
with the LRE mandate.106 Distinguishing the Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley, 
the Sixth Circuit noted that Rowley failed to address the LRE provision,107 setting 
forth the first standard for determining whether a disabled child’s educational 
placement satisfies the LRE requirement of educating disabled children with 
nondisabled children to the maximum extent appropriate. The court noted:
In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should 
determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be 
feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the 
segregated school would be inappropriate under the [IDEA]. Framing the issue 
in this manner accords the proper respect for the strong preference in favor of 
mainstreaming while still realizing the possibility that some handicapped 
children simply must be educated in segregated facilities either because the 
handicapped child would not benefit from mainstreaming, because any 
marginal benefits received from mainstreaming are far outweighed by the 
benefits gained from services which could not feasibly be provided in the non-
segregated setting, or because the handicapped child is a disruptive force in the 
non-segregated setting. Cost is a proper factor to consider since excessive 
spending on one handicapped child deprives other handicapped children.108
 Under this framework, the initial inquiry is whether it is feasible to provide 
additional services in a regular setting that satisfy the disabled child’s educational, 
physical, and emotional needs.109 If so, the school district should assess the following 
three factors: (1) whether the benefits of educating the student in the regular 
classroom outweigh the benefits of placing the child in a special education classroom 
(which provides services that cannot be provided in a non-segregated setting); 
(2) whether the disabled child is disruptive in the regular setting (e.g., the child 
distracts other students or requires excessive supervision); and (3) whether the cost of 
placing the child in the regular classroom requires excessive resources (such that 
other disabled students would be deprived of essential resources).110
 The court explained that framing the analysis in this manner promotes Congress’s 
preference for mainstreaming, yet acknowledges that a regular setting is inappropriate 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 1062.
107. Id. at 1062 (“[T]his case involves the mainstreaming provision of the [IDEA] while Rowley involved a 
choice between two methods for educating a deaf student.”). 
108. Id. at 1063. 
109. See id.
110. See id. Although cost is an appropriate consideration, it is not a defense “if the school district has failed 
to use its funds to provide a proper continuum of alternative placements for handicapped children. The 
provision of such alternative placements benefits all handicapped children.” Id.
667
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 59 | 2014/15
for some disabled students.111 The case was consequently remanded back to the 
district court to determine “whether Neill’s educational, physical or emotional needs 
require some service which could not feasibly be provided in a class for handicapped 
children within a regular school or in the type of split program advocated by the 
State Board of Education.”112
  2. Adopted by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits
 In A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School District, the Eighth Circuit endorsed the Sixth 
Circuit’s feasibility test.113 The court focused on the third factor identified in 
Roncker—the cost of educating a child with severe disabilities in the regular 
classroom.114 The court emphasized that the LRE requirement must be viewed in 
light of the reality of limited public funds.115 Affirming the district court’s decision, 
the Eighth Circuit held that it was permitted “to consider both cost to the local 
school district and benefit to the child” from placement in regular school.116
 The Fourth Circuit also adopted the Sixth Circuit’s feasibility test in DeVries v. 
Fairfax County School Board.117 The court contemplated the benefits of educating a 
seventeen-year-old autistic student in the regular classroom, and whether those 
benefits substantially outweighed the benefits of placing the child in a segregated 
vocational center located in a regular high school campus.118 Finding that he would 
“glean little from the lectures,” perform at a lower level, and barely communicate even 
with an aide’s assistance, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision to place the child in 
the vocational school rather than the regular public high school.119
 B. The Two-Prong Test
 Declining to follow the Sixth Circuit’s approach, the Fifth Circuit formulated its 
own test for evaluating school district compliance with the LRE requirement.120 The 
standard espoused by the Fifth Circuit is currently the most prevailing test among 
the circuit courts.121 While only three circuits follow the three-factor feasibility test, 
111. Id.
112. Id. 
113. 813 F.2d 158, 163–64 (8th Cir. 1987).
114. Id. at 163.
115. Id. at 164.
116. Id. at 163.
117. 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989).
118. Id. at 877.
119. Id. at 879–80. 
120. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
121. See P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008); L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966 
(10th Cir. 2004); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 
950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991).
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five circuits have adopted the two-prong test over the span of nineteen years—the 
most recent being the Second Circuit in 2008.122
  1. Established by the Fifth Circuit
 Six years after Roncker was decided, the Fifth Circuit confronted the issue of 
school district compliance with the IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement.123 In Daniel 
R.R. v. Board of Education, the Fifth Circuit declined to follow the Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis in Roncker and instead devised its own two-prong test.124 Daniel suffered 
from Downs Syndrome;125 although Daniel was six-years-old, he possessed 
communication skills of a two-year-old and had a developmental age of a two- to 
three-year-old.126 When Daniel attended a regular pre-kindergarten class, the 
teacher had to alter her teaching methods and modify the curriculum.127 However, 
Daniel still required constant individual attention and could not master basic skills.128 
Consequently, the school district’s Admission, Review and Dismissal Committee 
decided that pre-kindergarten was inappropriate for Daniel and accordingly changed 
his placement.129 Under the new placement, Daniel would attend the special 
education pre-kindergarten class, eat lunch with nondisabled students three days 
each week, and interact with nondisabled students during recess.130 Arguing that the 
Committee “improperly shut the door to regular education for Daniel,” Daniel’s 
parents appealed to an impartial hearing officer who affirmed the Committee’s 
decision.131 Daniel’s parents subsequently filed an action in the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Texas, alleging that Daniel’s new placement violated the 
LRE provision;132 however, the court upheld the Committee’s decision.133
 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Roncker test, claiming that the Sixth 
Circuit’s feasibility standard encroaches upon state and local school officials’ 
delegated authority.134 The court reasoned that educational policy choices, such as 
determining the feasibility of providing a particular service in a regular or special 
122. See cases cited supra note 121.
123. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d 1036. 
124. Id. at 1046–48.
125. Id. at 1039.
126. Id.
127. Id. (“Modifying the Pre-kindergarten curriculum and her teaching methods sufficiently to reach Daniel 
would have required [the schoolteacher] to modify the curriculum almost beyond recognition.”).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1040.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1046. 
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education setting, are deliberately left to state and local school authorities whose 
expertise in the field counsels against second-guessing by the courts.135 Moreover, 
the court criticized the Roncker test because it barely referenced the language of the 
statute,136 contending that the proper standard for evaluating compliance with the 
mainstreaming requirement should instead mimic the statutory text.137
 Adhering to the text of the statute, the Fifth Circuit set forth a two-prong test 
for determining compliance with the mainstreaming requirement.138 First, the court 
must determine “whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of 
supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily.”139 If appropriate 
education cannot be achieved satisfactorily in the regular classroom, and specialized 
placement is therefore necessary, the court must then determine “whether the school 
has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate.”140
 Compliance with the mainstreaming requirement is determined on a case-by-
case basis. Courts consider the following factors when applying the first prong of the 
Fifth Circuit test: (1)  the efforts the school district has made to accommodate the 
child in the regular classroom (such as modifying the regular curriculum or providing 
teacher aides); (2) the educational benefits the child receives from regular education; 
(3) the overall educational experience the child has in a regular education environment 
(such as learning language and behavior skills from nondisabled students); and 
(4) the effect the disabled child’s presence has on the regular classroom (such as 
being disruptive to other students or burdensome to the instructor).141 Under this 
framework, “no single factor is dispositive.”142
 Upon analyzing these factors as a whole, the court concluded that the school 
district could not educate Daniel satisfactorily in the regular education classroom.143 
First, the court evaluated the steps the school district had taken to accommodate 
Daniel in the regular classroom.144 Daniel’s pre-kindergarten teacher had made 
substantial efforts to modify the pre-kindergarten curriculum but, unfortunately, 
those efforts yielded minimal benefits for Daniel.145 The court explained that states 
need not “provide every conceivable supplementary aid or service to assist the 
135. Id. (contending that the Roncker test “necessitates too intrusive an inquiry into the educational policy 
choices that Congress deliberately left to state and local school officials”).
136. Id.
137. See id. at 1048. 
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1048–49. 
142. Id. at 1048.
143. Id. at 1051.
144. Id. at 1050.
145. Id.
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[disabled] child.”146 Regular education instructors are neither required “to devote all 
or most of their time to one handicapped child” nor should they “modify the regular 
education program beyond recognition.”147 Tailoring the curriculum to Daniel’s 
needs would have required a ninety to one hundred percent modification—an effort 
that mainstreaming does not require.148 Thus, the court found that the school district 
had taken sufficient steps to accommodate Daniel.149
 Second, the court considered the educational benefits that Daniel received from 
regular education. This factor focuses “on the student’s ability to grasp the essential 
elements of the regular education curriculum.”150 In light of Daniel’s disability, which 
had severely impeded his developmental capabilities, and considering the pre-
kindergarten curriculum’s focus on developmental skills, Daniel could not master the 
class’s basic lessons.151 The court concluded that interacting with nondisabled students 
was the only benefit Daniel received from regular education.152 While conceding that 
“academic achievement is not the only purpose of mainstreaming,” the court concluded 
that specialized education was the more appropriate placement.153
 The third factor contemplates the benefits a disabled child may receive from non-
academic experiences in the regular education environment—for instance, whether the 
overall regular education experience offers beneficial language and behavior models 
through interaction with nondisabled students.154 These models may enhance a disabled 
child’s ability to develop social and communication skills.155 Thus, mainstreaming may 
be favored when a child benefits from the interaction with nondisabled students, despite 
the child’s inability to excel academically. In contrast, mainstreaming is not desirable if 
regular education fails to address the child’s unique educational needs.156 In Daniel R.R., 
the court found the exhausting and strenuous nature of the regular education program 
to be detrimental to Daniel, as it caused him to fall asleep at school and develop a 
146. Id. at 1048. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 1050.
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 1049.
151. Id. at 1050.
152. Id. at 1051 (“[T]he only value of regular education for Daniel is the interaction which he has with 
nonhandicapped students.”).
153. Id. at 1049, 1051.
154. See id. at 1049 (“[A] child may be able to absorb only a minimal amount of the regular education 
program, but may benefit enormously from the language models that his nonhandicapped peers provide 
for him.”).
155. See id. at 1047–48 (“[M]ainstreaming may have benefits in and of itself. For example, the language and 
behavior models available from nonhandicapped children may be essential or helpful to the handicapped 
child’s development.”).
156. Id. at 1049.
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stutter.157 When balanced against the benefits of special education (an environment in 
which Daniel was making progress), the court found that the opportunity for Daniel 
to interact with nondisabled students did not warrant mainstreaming.158
 Finally, courts consider whether the child’s presence in the regular classroom is 
disruptive to other students or burdensome on the teacher. Mainstreaming is not 
required when a disabled child’s disruptive behavior impairs the education of other 
students or when a child requires “so much of the instructor’s attention that the 
instructor will have to ignore the other student’s needs in order to tend to the 
handicapped child.”159 Although a teaching assistant may be able to “minimize the 
burden on the teacher,” if the disabled child “requires so much of the teacher or the 
aide’s time that the rest of the class suffers, then the balance will tip in favor of 
placing the child in special education.”160 In Daniel R.R., the court found that 
Daniel’s presence in regular pre-kindergarten was unfair to the rest of the class, as he 
required all or most of the teacher’s attention.161
 Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that the factors—individually and in 
the aggregate—tipped the scale in favor of placing Daniel in special education and 
suggested that the school district could not educate Daniel satisfactorily in the 
regular education classroom.162
 Accordingly, the court applied the test’s second prong, which evaluates whether 
the school district mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate.163 To 
satisfy the second prong, “the school must take intermediate steps where appropriate, 
such as placing the child in regular education for some academic classes and in 
special education for others, mainstreaming the child for nonacademic classes only, 
or providing interaction with nonhandicapped children during lunch and recess.”164 
In Daniel R.R., the school district mainstreamed Daniel for lunch and recess.165 The 
court found that this intermediate step of mainstreaming satisfied the LRE 
provision.166 Consequently, the court held that the school district had complied with 
the mainstreaming requirement since (1) education in the regular classroom, even 
with the use of supplementary aids and services, could not be achieved satisfactorily, 
and (2) the school district’s specialized placement enabled Daniel to interact with 
nondisabled students to the maximum extent appropriate.167
157. Id. at 1051.
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 1049.
160. Id. at 1049–50.
161. Id. at 1051.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1050–51.
164. Id. at 1050 (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 1039.
166. Id. at 1051.
167. Id. 
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  2. Adopted by the Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
 Four circuits have adopted the two-prong test since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Daniel R.R.168 In Greer v. Rome City School District, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the 
Fifth Circuit’s two-prong test, emphasizing the importance of considering the “full 
range of supplemental aids and services, including resource rooms and itinerant 
instruction, that could be provided to assist [the disabled child] in the regular 
classroom.”169 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the two-prong test “adheres so closely 
to the language of the [IDEA] and, therefore, clearly reflects Congressional intent.”170
 Similarly, the Third Circuit in Oberti v. Board of Education adopted the two-
prong test to determine whether the school district satisfied the LRE mandate.171 
Building on the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Greer, the court identified the vast 
range of supplemental aids and services that schools must consider, such as “speech 
and language therapy, special education training for the regular teacher, behavior 
modification programs, or any other available aids or services appropriate to the 
child’s particular disabilities.”172
 In 2004, the Tenth Circuit followed suit and embraced the two-prong test173 and, 
four years later, the Second Circuit did the same in P. v. Newington Board of Education.174
 C. The Four-Factor Balancing Test
 The Ninth Circuit devised its own four-factor balancing test to determine 
whether a school district’s placement decision violates the LRE provision,175 and is 
the only circuit court to employ this test.
  1. Established by the Ninth Circuit
 In 1994, the Ninth Circuit formulated a new standard for gaging compliance 
with the LRE requirement—a standard which derives some of its elements from 
both the Roncker feasibility test and Daniel R.R.’s two-prong test.176 Rachel Holland 
168. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008); L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966 (10th 
Cir. 2004); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 
F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991).
169. 950 F.2d at 698.
170. Id. at 696. 
171. See 995 F.2d at 1215.
172. Id. at 1216.
173. See Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d at 977 (“[T]his court is persuaded by the Daniel R.R. test and by the 
reasoning of the other circuits which have adopted it.”).
174. 546 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he two-pronged approach adopted by the Third, Fifth, 
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits provides appropriate guidance to the district courts without ‘too 
intrusive an inquiry into the educational policy choices that Congress deliberately left to state and local 
school officials.’” (quoting Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989))).
175. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
176. See id. at 1404.
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was a moderately intellectually disabled eleven-year-old.177 While Rachel’s parents 
wanted her to be placed full-time in a regular classroom, the school district rejected 
their request.178 Instead, the school district “proposed a placement that would have 
divided Rachel’s time between a special education class for academic subjects and a 
regular class for non-academic activities such as art, music, lunch, and recess.”179 
Rachel’s parents appealed the school district’s decision to an impartial hearing 
officer.180 Finding that the school district did not make sufficient efforts to educate 
Rachel in a regular class pursuant to the LRE mandate, the impartial hearing officer 
ordered the school district “to place Rachel in a regular classroom with support 
services, including a special education consultant and a part-time aide.”181 The school 
district appealed the decision to the district court.182
 In determining whether the school district’s proposed educational placement 
complied with the LRE provision, the district court evaluated the following four 
factors:
(1) the educational benefits available to Rachel in a regular classroom, 
supplemented with appropriate aids and services, as compared with the 
educational benefits of a special education classroom; (2) the non-academic 
benefits of interaction with children who were not disabled; (3) the effect of 
Rachel’s presence on the teacher and other children in the classroom; and  
(4) the cost of mainstreaming Rachel in a regular classroom.183
 Applying this framework, the district court found that: (1) Rachel received 
substantial educational benefits in a regular classroom “with some modification to the 
curriculum and with the assistance of a part-time aide”;184 (2) Rachel developed her 
social skills and gained self-confidence from placement in a regular classroom; 
(3) “Rachel followed directions and was well-behaved and not a distraction in class”;185 
and (4) the school district failed to satisfy its burden of proving that “educating Rachel 
in a regular classroom with appropriate services would be significantly more expensive 
than educating her in the District’s proposed setting.”186 Since each of the four factors 
weighed in favor of mainstreaming Rachel, the district court “concluded that the 
177. Id. at 1400. 
178. Id.
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 1400–01. 
184. Id. at 1401.
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 1401–02.
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appropriate placement for Rachel was full-time in a regular second grade classroom 
with some supplemental services.”187
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted wholesale the district court’s balancing 
test.188 To date, no other circuit court has adopted this four-factor balancing test.
iV.  a prOpOsEd sOLUtiOn tO adOpt thE tWO-prOng tEst UsEd bY a 
MaJOritY Of CirCUit COUrts
 The Supreme Court’s silence has triggered a three-way circuit split over the proper 
standard for assessing school district compliance with the IDEA’s LRE requirement.189 
In turn, the differing judicial approaches have produced disparate outcomes for special 
education students across the nation.190 Fashioning a solution that helps (and is well 
suited to) the wide range of students with disabilities poses a great challenge. But the 
lack of clear and uniform guidelines amid the lower courts’ divergent interpretations 
highlights the need to devise a clear, uniform, and nationwide approach to evaluating 
educational placement decisions under the LRE provision.191
 The two-prong test formulated by the Fifth Circuit in Daniel R.R. is currently the 
most widely adopted framework among the circuit courts. The two-prong test is also 
the most workable and most appropriate standard for three reasons: (1) it best reflects 
congressional intent; (2) it resolves the tension between the IDEA’s free appropriate 
public education requirement and its LRE mandate; and (3) it comports best with 
notions of federalism and the states’ traditional authority over educational policy.
 A. The Two-Prong Test Better Reflects Congressional Intent 
 The two-prong test asks: (1) “whether the child can be educated satisfactorily in 
a regular classroom with supplemental aids and services”;192 and (2) “whether the 
school has included the child in school programs with nondisabled children to the 
maximum extent appropriate.”193 By tracing the language of the statute, this two-
step approach fully effectuates the congressional intent behind the LRE provision.
 For instance, the first prong is reflected in the LRE provision, which prohibits 
school districts from taking a disabled child out of the regular classroom unless “the 
nature or severity of the disability . . . is such that education in regular classes with 
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”194 
187. Id. at 1402. 
188. Id. at 1404.
189. Farley, supra note 37, at 818–19.
190. See id. at 831 (“Application of the varying tests for determining compliance with the LRE provision 
leads to potential disparity in outcomes, depending solely on geographic location. Such disparity could 
be avoided with the adoption of a single, nationwide test.”).
191. See id. at 819, 832. 
192. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215–16 (3d Cir. 1993).
193. Id. at 1218 (citing Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048, 1050 (5th Cir. 1989)).
194. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2013).
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Furthermore, the factors used to evaluate whether the first prong has been met— 
(1) the steps taken to accommodate the disabled child in the regular classroom, 
(2) the educational benefits from regular education, (3) the overall educational 
experience, and (4) the effect of the disabled child’s presence on the regular classroom 
environment195—clearly reflect Congress’s intent to enhance disabled students’ access 
to the regular classroom and to educate them along with their nondisabled peers.196
 Additionally, the second prong closely follows the IDEA’s language as it 
contemplates whether the child has received an education with nondisabled children 
to the maximum extent appropriate.197 Further, unlike the other two tests, the Fifth 
Circuit two-prong test allows courts to assess under the first prong which factors are 
relevant based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.198 Thus, in 
addition to better ref lecting congressional intent, the Fifth Circuit’s two-part test 
allows for much needed flexibility under the first prong’s case-by-case approach.199
 Finally, unlike the other two tests, the Fifth Circuit’s f lexible framework 
recognizes the non-academic benefits f lowing from a desegregated education.200 
There are inherent, non-academic benefits in maintaining disabled students in an 
integrated environment, namely “social interaction” and regular “communication” 
with nondisabled students.201 The benefits of inclusion are reciprocal because it also 
teaches nondisabled students how to interact and communicate with their disabled 
peers.202 Considering the reciprocal non-academic benefits of integration is essential 
for achieving Congress’s objective in passing the IDEA, as one principal purpose of 
195. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048–49. 
196. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); see also Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216 (emphasizing that a school will likely 
violate the LRE’s mainstreaming directive if it fails to modify or supplement the regular education 
curriculum in order to accommodate a disabled child).
197. Compare Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050 (stating that schools fulfill their obligations under the IDEA if 
they “have provided [students with disabilities with] the maximum appropriate exposure to non-
handicapped students”), with 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (requiring schools to educate children with 
disabilities alongside nondisabled children “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate”); see also Oberti, 995 
F.2d at 1215 (“We think this two-part test, which closely tracks the language of [the LRE provision], is 
faithful to the IDEA’s directive that children with disabilities be educated with nondisabled children ‘to 
the maximum extent appropriate.’” (quoting § 1412(a)(5)(A)); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 
688, 696 (11th Cir. 1991)  (“Because this test adheres so closely to the language of the [IDEA] and, 
therefore, clearly ref lects Congressional intent, we adopt it.”).
198. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048–49; see also Beth B. v. Van Clay, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1031 (N.D. Ill. 
2001) (“[W]e agree with the Fifth Circuit that the factors must be case-specific. Daniel R.R. draws on 
the statutory language to set a general framework—a test—and then examines several factors in its 
application of that test.”).
199. Farley, supra note 37, at 834–35.
200. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049 (“[A]cademic achievement is not the only purpose of mainstreaming.”); 
see also Greer, 950 F.2d at 697 (“Integrating a handicapped child into a nonhandicapped environment 
may be beneficial in and of itself.” (quoting Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049)).
201. Farley, supra note 37, at 838.
202. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217 n.24. 
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the act was to address and remedy the social harm wrought by segregated educational 
facilities.203
 Based on the foregoing, the Fifth Circuit two-prong test promotes best the intent 
underlying the LRE provision.
 B. The Two-Prong Test Resolves the Tension Between the IDEA’s Conflicting Mandates
 The school’s use of supplementary aids and services is foundational to striking 
the proper balance between the IDEA’s commitment to provide a free appropriate 
public education and its preference for educating students in the least restrictive 
environment. Providing additional services to disabled students enables the school to 
simultaneously educate them in the regular classroom while addressing their 
individual education needs.204 Therefore, the two-prong framework, unlike the 
feasibility test, strikes the proper balance between educating disabled students in the 
regular classroom and ensuring a free appropriate public education for all.205
 The Fifth Circuit’s two-part framework consists of two separate inquiries: 
(1) would the disabled student receive a satisfactory education in the regular classroom 
by way of supplementary aids and services; and (2) if the first question yields a negative 
answer—i.e., if a more segregated environment would better serve the student’s unique 
educational needs—then the question turns on whether the school’s specialized 
placement mainstreams the child to the maximum extent possible (for example, by 
enabling interaction with nonhandicapped students during lunch, recess, and other 
non-academic activities). The first prong adheres to congressional intent by making 
placement in the regular classroom the default educational setting, as required by the 
LRE provision.206 More importantly, the test’s second prong recognizes that regular 
classroom placement is not a one-size-fits-all solution, especially considering Congress’s 
command that all disabled children receive a free appropriate public education.207 
However, even when a more segregated educational placement is warranted, the second 
prong demands that the school district take steps to mainstream the student to the 
maximum extent possible.208 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit’s two-part framework 
resolves the tension (and strikes the proper balance) between the IDEA’s competing 
mandates: integration and satisfactory education.
203. See discussion supra Part II.
204. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215. 
205. The Ninth Circuit’s four-factor balancing test is f lexible in nature and would thus, in theory, allow 
courts to strike a sensible balance between the IDEA’s seemingly conflicting mandates. However, the 
test provides no guidance as to the relative weight to be accorded each of its four factors. See Sacramento 
City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). This inevitably leads to 
inconsistent and arbitrary placement determinations. See, e.g., Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830, 836–37 
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding two factors militating in favor of regular classroom placement and two against, 
yet upholding the school’s restrictive placement).
206. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2013).
207. Id. § 1412(a)(1).
208. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.117 (2014).
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 C. The Two-Prong Test Best Comports with Principles of Federalism 
 Education has always been an area of state regulation. And educational policy is 
one of the few spheres of authority that have been traditionally recognized as 
exclusively committed to the states.209 In recent years, the federal government has 
employed its spending power to incentivize states to adopt or modify educational 
policy goals as applied to discrete segments of the student population.210 However, 
even under conditional spending programs such as the IDEA, courts must remain 
careful not to impute to Congress an intent of upsetting the federalism status quo 
and, specifically, the states’ traditional authority over their own educational policy.211 
While the Supreme Court has yet to address the IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement, 
the Rowley Court did warn the lower courts not “to substitute their own notions of 
sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.”212 
Thus, while federal courts have a duty to ensure that recipient states comply with the 
IDEA’s substantive standards, they may not “impose substantive standards of review 
which cannot be derived from the Act itself.”213
 The Fifth Circuit’s two-part framework heeds the Supreme Court’s warning in 
Rowley because, unlike the feasibility test, it does not excessively intrude “into the 
educational policy choices that Congress deliberately left to state and local school 
officials.”214 Rather, by closely tracking the language of the IDEA, the two-prong test 
guarantees that courts would not meddle with the states’ educational policy, except 
insofar as Congress has provided.215 The feasibility test, by contrast, is “too intrusive 
an inquiry”216 into the states’ educational policy judgments because it fails to accord 
local school officials the deference that difficult educational policy questions ought to 
209. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education in our Nation is 
committed to the control of state and local authorities.”). “Traditionally, policymakers have supported 
state and local control rather than federal directives and federal education legislation has normally 
contained strong prohibitions against federal control of education.” Gail L. Sunderman & Jimmy 
Kim, Expansion of Federal Power in American Education: Federal-State Relationships 
Under the No Child Left Behind Act, Year One 4 (The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ. 
eds., 2004).
210. Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 Emory L.J. 125, 127 (2006).
211. See generally John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 399 
(2010).
212. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). “It is clear that Congress was aware of the States’ 
traditional role in the formulation and execution of educational policy. ‘Historically, the States have had 
the primary responsibility for the education of children at the elementary and secondary level.’” Id. at 
208 n.30 (quoting 121 Cong. Rec. 19,498 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Dole)).
213. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206 (holding that IDEA § 1415(e)’s directive that “the reviewing court ‘receive the 
records of the [state] administrative proceedings’ carries with it the implied requirement that due weight 
shall be given to these proceedings” (alteration in original)).
214. Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989).
215. See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Farley, supra note 37, at 834.
216. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1046.
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receive.217 Therefore, the feasibility test runs counter to the deferential stance the 
Supreme Court has mandated when reviewing school districts’ placement decisions 
under the IDEA.218
 Similarly, by requiring states to prove that mainstream education “would be 
significantly more expensive than [placement in a specialized program],”219 the Ninth 
Circuit’s four-factor balancing test entails the same sort of second-guessing of state 
educational policies that Rowley warns against.220 Thus, it is clear that the Fifth 
Circuit two-prong test is the most comprehensive, effective approach—consistent 
with federalism principles—to evaluating educational placement decisions.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 By enacting the IDEA, Congress sought to rectify the pervasive practice of denying 
students with disabilities access to publicly funded education.221 The act’s LRE 
provision ultimately reflects the congressional intent to educate disabled children in the 
regular classroom to the maximum extent appropriate for each child’s particular needs. 
Unfortunately, discerning congressional intent has produced multiple interpretations, 
partly due to the Supreme Court’s silence on the standard by which to determine state 
compliance with the LRE provision.
 As this note has explained, the two-prong test espoused by the Fifth Circuit—and 
subsequently adopted by four other circuits—should be uniformly adopted. As the 
most widely accepted standard among the circuit courts, the trend in case law reveals 
that this framework best reflects Congress’s intent in passing the IDEA and resolves 
the tension between the IDEA’s seemingly conflicting mandates. Importantly, the 
two-part framework ensures school district compliance with the LRE provision 
without unnecessarily encroaching on the states’ traditional authority over educational 
policy. Implementing a clear nationwide approach, such as the two-prong framework, 
would ensure equal educational access to students with disabilities while eliminating 
disparate educational placements across the nation—just as Congress intended.
217. See P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]hile our review is de novo, it 
is tinged with a significant degree of deference to the state educational agency, as we are essentially 
acting in an administrative-law-style capacity.”).
218. “The very importance which Congress has attached to compliance with [IDEA procedures] . . . would 
be frustrated if a court were permitted simply to set state decisions at nought.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
219. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1994).
220. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see also L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 977 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[The 
Fifth Circuit’s framework] acknowledge[s] the fiscal reality that school districts with limited resources 
must balance the needs of each disabled child with the needs of other children in the district.” (emphasis 
added)).
221. See discussion supra Part II.
